1 Propagated largely by a boom and bust cycle in the residential real estate market the financial crisis of 2007-2009 spilled over into the real economy producing the longest business cycle downturn of the post war era. 1 The Great Recession, as it became to be known, sparked a political response that included the appropriation of $700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the fall of 2008 to rehabilitate the financial system by shoring up the balance sheets of major financial firms. 2 This was followed by The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 3 TARP was part of efforts to restore credit flows, particularly bank lending, in an effort to kick-start economic growth. Of particular concern would be access to credit by small businesses who would be most affected by a retrenchment of bank lending. After all, unlike large firms small businesses cannot directly access capital markets. Hence, the continued decline in bank credit facilities and especially bank commercial credit facilities from the onset of the crisis through the end of 2010 is likely to have a disproportionate impact on growth in the small business sector.
commonly referred to as the stimulus package, which provided for $862 billion in new federal expenditures to combat the continued slowdown in economic activity. In both cases opening up the public purse was seen as an antidote to the collapse in economic activity. 4 Concerns about access to credit for small business, particularly when there is a retrenchment in the growth of bank supplied credit, are grounded in economic theory-information problems in credit markets can lead to credit rationing. Greater uncertainty during business cycle down turns has the potential to exacerbate credit rationing. So it is not surprising that calls for government intervention into small enterprise credit markets reach a crescendo during the trough of the credit cycle.
This is turn could affect the strength and sustainability of the economic recovery. In what follows we present evidence that bank lending and in particular small business lending has declined over the recent economic downturn. We then describe the economics of small enterprise credit markets. Next we outline how in theory Small Business Administration (SBA) loan guarantees can help complete the market. We then provide an overview of some of our empirical work on SBA loan guarantees that supports our contention that SBA loan guarantees are one of the few government interventions in small enterprise credit markets that may produce positive net social benefits.
Whether government intervention in small enterprise credit markets is warranted is not the central issue here. Rather, it is whether the net social benefit of a particular intervention is positiveweighing in the direct cost of the intervention and the costs associated with the unintended impact of government interventions on private incentives. For this to be the case, the intervention should be designed to correct the market failure. Small Business Administration loan guarantees are arguably such an intervention.
Bank lending over the recent economic cycle
The onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and the sharp business cycle downturn that followed produced a sharp retrenchment in credit markets. Of greatest concern for the small business sector was the contraction of bank lending. Specifically it shows that just prior to financial crisis that the broad credit markets provided nearly 23 percent of small business credit -much of this in the form of securitized 
The economics of small enterprise credit markets
Fundamental information problems in small enterprise credit markets can produce a market equilibrium that is inefficient as lenders undersupply loans. While deviations from market efficiency may be slight, and hence, do not merit corrective public intervention there are cases where information problems are severe enough that they lead to credit rationing and constitute the failure of the credit market. In their seminal work on information problems in credit markets Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss demonstrate that price alone may not equilibrate demand and supply in credit markets.
14 Importantly, Stiglitz and Weiss show that in equilibrium a loan market may be characterized by credit rationing. They reason that banks making loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan. However, the interest rate may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of bank loans by either sorting potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect) or influencing the actions of borrowers (the moral hazard effect). Both effects derive directly from the imperfect They also show that the corresponding disequilibrium would unlikely be just a temporary phenomenon. information that is present in loan markets after banks have evaluated loan applications. When the price (interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that price will also clear the market.
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The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having different likelihoods of repaying their loans, a probability known to the borrowers but not the lenders. The expected return to the bank on a loan obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. It is difficult to identify such borrowers; partially because the borrowers have more information than the lender.
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Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior of the borrower is also likely to change. For instance, raising the interest rate decreases the payoffs of successful projects.
Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to undertake riskier projects -projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful. In other words, the price a firm pays for credit may affect the riskiness of its investment decisions, which is the moral hazard problem.
Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so. The interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device. For example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, worse risks if borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. So, as the interest rate rises, the average "riskiness"
of those who are willing to borrow increases, and this may actually result in lowering the bank's expected profits from lending.
As a result of these two effects, a bank's expected return may increase less for an additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease as the interest rate is increased.
Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium.
17 15 In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of borrowers. This is because each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of borrowers. If the bank made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then the bank's loan portfolio would have the same risk and return characteristics of the pool of borrowers.
Although traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this case. This is because the bank would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the average current borrower. The expected return on a loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank is currently making. Hence, there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed.
As a single price cannot clear the lending market a "second price" or screening mechanism may be required. Examples of second prices in lending markets include: the use of credit scores, collateral, loan commitments (which involve a two-part pricing, a fixed fee for the line of credit and lending rate attached to the loan} and relationships. Relationships are a form of informal loan commitment and have been recognized by economists as an important market mechanism for reducing credit rationing.
18
The relationship-lending literature suggests that in addition to being formed over time, relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products. That is, borrowers may obtain more than just loans from a bank. Borrowers may purchase a variety of financial services such as checking and savings accounts. These added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm's borrowing cost in two ways.
First, they increase the precision of the lender's information about the borrower. For example, the lender can learn about the firm's sales by monitoring the cash flowing through its checking account or by factoring the firm's accounts receivables. Second, the lender can spread any fixed costs of monitoring the firm over multiple products.
Lending is based on limited information on the quality of borrowers in the market, but a close and continued interaction between a firm and a bank may provide a lender with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm's affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit.
Conditional on its positive past experience with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky, which should reduce its average cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds. Overall, the available evidence points to a significantly positive relationship between factors related to the strength and duration of the lending relationships among banks and small business customers and both the terms (lower loan rates and fewer loan covenants) and availability of credit. From the perspective of the banks, the stronger the relationship, the more likely the borrower is to select the bank for future credit needs and other banking services. However, because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.
SBA Loan Guarantees
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior. In other words, loan guarantees are another way of mitigating credit rationing in small enterprise loan markets. They serve as a substitute for collateral and/or relationships in the loan decision process and in theory should result in an increase in credit extended to small businesses. By reducing the downside losses associated with loan defaults the guarantee allows the lender to charge a lower interest rate on the loan, which reduces both the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In addition, SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment. As such, SBA loan guarantee programs potentially improve credit allocation in small enterprise loan markets by providing a better set of market completion services than private remedies alone. Of course, as any government intervention into markets, SBA loan guarantees likely distort credit markets in unintended ways -possibly resulting in an oversupply of loans to small enterprises, reducing economic efficiency. Ultimately, the net effect of SBA loan guarantees is an empirical question. One we have looked at in a number of earlier papers.
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The empirical question of interest to us is whether SBA loan guarantees improve the functioning of small business credit markets -a necessary condition for them having net social benefits. Unfortunately, data limitations precluded us from directly testing this hypothesis. Consequently, we turned to an indirect approach. A necessary condition for SBA loan guarantees to have net positive social benefits is 19 The papers reviewed include, Ben R. they have a positive impact on economic outcomes. As the effect of these programs will be the greatest at the local level, this is where we focus our analysis. What we do in our papers is test whether a measure of SBA loan guarantees, scaled to a market, impact measures of local economic performanceusing MSAs and rural (non MSA) counties as our definition of the local market. Our sample period runs from 1991 through 2001. Depending on the nature of the question asked we use either per capital personal income or employment as the measure of economic performance. 20 Overall, our work finds evidence consistent with SBA loan guarantees improving the allocation of credit in small business loan markets. In Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2008) we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. And the intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in lowincome markets. Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is positive and significant only in low-income markets. 21 In Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007) we find the level of SBA-guaranteed lending activity (per $1000 of deposits) is positively related to the growth of per capita income at the local market level-for both urban and rural markets. 22 The impact of SBA-guaranteed lending on growth appears to be small. However, this small measurable economic impact of SBA loan guarantees on local economic growth would be expected given the limited role they play in the overall (small and large firm) credit intermediation process. We have extended these basic results in a number of ways to get a better idea of what is driving the positive relationship between measures of SBA loan guarantees and local economic performance.
SBA loan guarantees and local economic performance is stronger in markets with high shares of minority populations and in less-financially developed areas.
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The results from our studies need to be interpreted with caution. For one, data limitation do not allow us to control for small-business lending at the local market level, so we do not know whether SBA loan guarantee programs are contributing to economic performance by helping to complete the market for small firm credit or whether they are simply proxying for small business lending in the market. This might be the case if there is a positive correlation between the level of SBA loan guarantees and small business lending in a market. Second, we are not able to test whether SBA loan guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in a market -are SBA guaranteed credits simply being substituted for non guaranteed small business loans? This question gets to the heart of whether SBA programs improve social welfare because it is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA loan guarantees. In other words, finding a positive correlation between measures of SBA guarantees and local economic performance is only the first step towards establishing the desirability of these programs. More evidence is needed to establish that SBA guaranteed lending programs are welfare enhancing.
Conclusions
Small businesses are likely to remain a sacred cow of public policy. The popular view, founded or unfounded, that small businesses are the engine of economic growth and development means they are likely to enjoy continued government support -consternation by policymakers over the terms and access to credit by small business in the most recent economic cycle is consistent with this view.
However, government interventions into small enterprise credit markets are likely to produce net social benefits only in those cases where the intervention is motivated by and designed to correct a market failure. Loan guarantee programs such as those offered by the Small Business administration may one such intervention. Moreover, in our previous work on SBA loan guarantees we find evidence that is consistent with SBA loan guarantees producing positive net social benefits. Considerably more work, however, needs to be done before the desirability of this government intervention can be established.
